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SINO-SOVIET DETENTE: NEW CHALLENGE
FOR AMERICAN INTERESTS IN ASIA 1
Mikhail Gorbachev has been in power for nearly four years and during
that time the West has come to accept a dazzling array of bold policy
initiatives and unorthodox proposals from Moscow covering the gamut from
arms control to regional conflicts. The sweep of glasnost and perestroika
have deeply and fundamentally altered the temper of international relations.
Indeed the very rapidity with which the Soviet Union has changed the
political and strategic configuration of global politics has generated a
troubling lack of agreement among Western policy-makers over the nature
and direction of an appropriate response.to these Soviet initiatives. Perhaps a
consensus is emerging, however, that both historic new opportunities and
challenges are at hand for East-West relations. In particular, Soviet policy
activism may have opened exciting new realms for cooperative ventures in
reducing threats to peace at both the regional and global levels. Nevertheless,
despite fervent hopes for an enduring reduction in hostilities, it is perhaps
only prudent for policy-makers to respond cautiously to the Soviet Union,
recognizing that the Soviet Union remains a heavily armed military7 power
with unsettled internal politics.
• I would like to thank the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School's Research Council for
its support in preparation of this paper. The views expressed are the author's and do not
represent the position of the Department of the Navy or the U.S. Government.
2.
The call for a cautious rather than euphoric American response to President
Gorbachev's proposals is widely found within diverse circles of governmental decision-
makers, academic analysts and media commentators. For example, Secretary of State
James Baker recommends a measured appraisal and cautious assessment of Soviet
proposals (New York Times, January 18, 1989) as does Senator Bill Bradley (Christian
Science Monitor, February 15, 1989). While noted New York Times commentator. A.M.
Rosenthal has recommended strengthening international political agreements with the Soviet
Union, he feels the U.S. should forego any substantial American economic assistance to
that country. Rosenthal argues that much more substantive political changes are required in
the Soviet Union and that "one day we may well want to use capitalist economic power—to
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At this critical stage in evolving superpower relations, careful
assessments are needed of the implications of recent Soviet foreign policy
initiatives for Western security. These assessments are useful for indicating
to Western policy-makers the most significant avenues for mutually
beneficial relations with the Soviets—and for indicating those arenas where
rivalry and competition remain primary. As Brent Scowcroft, President
Bush's national security advisor, recently remarked, notwithstanding hopes
to the contrary, "the Cold War is not over" therefore prudence remains
vital.
Although the 1960s and 1970s witnessed a remarkable expansion of
Soviet global power, events in the 1980s indicate that Soviet international
success was secured at expense of internal deterioration. Soviet decision-
makers have now apparently concluded that the status of the Soviet Union as a
global military superpower is in jeopardy if the stagnation, indeed
support a change (in the Soviet Union) to a free society. But (recent change in the Soviet
Union) is just the first act of a new Soviet drama. There is time to see it play out
awhile...." (New York Times, February 17,1989). An additional warning comes from the
well-known strategic and Soviet affairs specialist, Edward Luttwak, that recent internal
changes in the Soviet Union are "entirely reversible." Indeed Professor Luttwak argues that
the new Soviet foreign policy of conciliatory gestures, announced troop withdrawals,
disengagements from regional conflicts and new flexibility in arms control "all remain
quickly reversible." For a recent statement of his views, see New York Times, February 7,
1989.
3.
Mr. Scowcroft also indicated that the Bush Administration views Gorbachev's
"peace offensive" as partly inspired by a desire to drive a wedge between the United States
and its allies. See Los Angeles Times, January 23,1989.
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contraction of the domestic economy is not reversed. In this respect, Soviet
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze recently stated, in remarks generally critical
of the military, that the armed forces can only be as strong as the state of the
economy and science permit. Yet the centralized Soviet economy is a model
of inefficiency, suffering not only low productivity and misplaced
investments but also significant inflation and chronically large budget
deficits, deficits proportionately much larger than those in the United States.
Key Soviet officials are in fact making a direct connection between
radical internal domestic changes and successful external policies. Well over
three years ago, Shevardnadze gave some indication of new Soviet thinking
when he stated that "the foreign policy of any state is inseparably linked to its
internal affairs" and that to implement perestroika at home, "the Soviet Union
4
In 1987 two Soviet economists suggested that per capita output was slightly lower
in the mid-1980s than it had been a decade earlier. Senior officials have subsequently
indicated an even bleaker situation. Abel Aganbegyan, one of Gorbachev's top advisors,
has stated that Soviet national income had virtually no growth between 1981-1985,
implying a per capita decline of almost 1% per year (New York Times, November
23,1988). These figures stand in contrast to more optimistic CIA estimates which had
suggested that the Soviet economy grew by 2% per year since the 1970s. The extent of the
Soviet economic malaise remains a highly controversial topic among Western analysts. If
the more pessimistic view is also a more accurate assessment of Soviet economic decline
then it suggests that military expenditures have placed a much heavier burden on the Soviet
economy than generally realized. In other words, the Soviet Union would be in a weaker
negotiating position in arms talks with the U.S. than many believe. On the other hand,
senior Soviet officials may have been excessively pessimistic in an attempt to further
discredit Gorbachev's predecessors and thus to that extent may exaggerate the extent of the
Soviet decline.
' Christian Science Monitor, February 3, 1989.
* New York Times, January 26, 1989. Although Western analysts remain uncertain.
Gorbachev may have won the support of the Soviet military on the need for revitalizing the
Soviet economy through a reallocation of resources from the defense to civilian sectors.
This reasoning is congruent with recent Gorbachev statements announcing a 14.2%
reduction in the defense budget and a 19.5% decline in the production of military
equipment. (Christian Science Monitor, February 3, 1989).
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needs a durable peace." In other words, the domestic and foreign policies of
the Soviet Union are now viewed as two separate but intersecting realms: a
prime purpose of domestic economic reform is the strengthening of Soviet
global capability while concurrently a shift in the instruments of foreign
policy to political and diplomatic tools is required to reduce the costs
associated with the Soviet's enduring global rivalry with the United States. In
Soviet calculations domestic reform and foreign policy success are thus part
of the same policy continuum—external peace is needed to bring about
domestic change while domestic change is required to enhance Soviet
capabilities in meeting foreign policy challenges.
The bleak assessment made by Soviet officials of the Soviet condition is
perhaps indicated by the significant risks Moscow is assuming in its recent
actions in Asia. Soviet troops have withdrawn from Afghanistan without
having stabilized the regime in Kabul and the Soviets have been putting
considerable pressure on Vietnam to withdraw from Kampuchea despite what
some observers see as only the moderate success of Phnom Penh in meeting
o
the challenge from the anti-government coalition.
A common theme in these actions and assessments is the recognition by
Soviet decision-makers of the need to craft and strengthen more than just the
military instrument of foreign policy if Moscow is to compete successfully
7.
Donald S. Zagoria, "Soviet-American Rivalry in Asia," in Andrzej Korbonski and
Francis Fukuyama, eds., The Soviet Union and the Third World, (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1987) p. 251.
' However, for a variety of reasons, some commentators now feel that it is unlikely
that the anti-regime coalition, headed by Prince Sihanouk and including the internationally
condemned Khmer Rouge, will triumph over the Vietnamese-installed Heng Samrin regime
after the Vietnamese complete their withdrawal. (Christian Science Monitor, February 2,
1989.) Further discussion of the Kampuchean conflict is found on pp. 30-33 below.
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politically (and militarily) with the United States. Certainly it appears that
the Soviet Union is actively attempting to narrow the gap which currently
exists between Soviet military power and Soviet political influence. Nowhere
is this more apparent that in the Asia-Pacific. Despite (indeed partly because
of) an aggressive and broadly-based military buildup, the Soviets are
acutely aware that they have little political influence in the region and have
neither participated in the "Pacific Century" nor shared in the economic and
political dynamism of the region. Eager to reverse this situation. President
Gorbachev has injected a new dynamism in Soviet policy and has focussed
9
Banning N. Garrett, "Gorbachev's Reassessment of Soviet Security Needs:
Implications for Northeast Asia," (paper presented at Australian National University's
Conference on Security and Arms Control in the North Pacific, 12-14 August, 1987) p. 16.
Garrett has argued that the Soviet Union is strengthening both its civilian and defense
technological bases in order to undertake more effective competition with the United States
in the 21st century.
' David Winterford, Assessing the Soviet Naval Build-up in Southeast Asia:
Threats to Regional Security, Naval Technical Report #NPS-56-88-024, September 1988.
' There is little doubt that the Soviet Union wants to become a significant economic
actor in the Asia-Pacific. Perhaps the most graphic action taken by Moscow to signal its
determination occurred when the Soviets sent a delegation to the 1988 Pacific Economic
Cooperation Conference (PECC) seeking membership in that organization. {Christian
Science Monitor, May 24, 1988) By simply attending the conference, Moscow had clearly
revised its earlier dogmatic condemnation of a "Pacific Community" as nothing more nor
less than a U.S-inspired military alliance directed against the Soviet Union. However, one
difficulty confronting Moscow is that only about 4-5% of its total trade is with Pacific
nations compared to at least 50% for most Pacific nations' trading with others in the region.
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several of his most stunning initiatives directly on Soviet relations with
Asia.
The purpose of this paper is to indicate several dimensions, goals and
actions of recent Soviet policy in Asia, particularly Soviet policy toward
China. One objective is an attempt to determine the degree to which present
Soviet policy represents change or continuity with the past. This paper also
seeks to indicate where U.S. interests in Asia may be facing new opportunities
but also stark new challenges—challenges arising largely from the newly
minted political coin that Moscow is successfully trading in Asia.
Specifically, this paper argues that the more enduring challenge confronting
the United States in Asia today may stem not from trade frictions but from
detente between China and the Soviet Union. Overall, this paper attempts to
indicate that the new Soviet political approach to the Asia-Pacific is both
complicating the political environment for the United States and altering the
threat perceptions among U.S. friends and allies in the region in ways which
may harm the attainment of U.S. security goals.
12.
' Gennady Gerasimov, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman, recently stated that
Soviet attention "is focussed on Asia .... China and Japan are the focus of our attention at
the moment." Christian Science Monitor, February 2, 1989.
It would not be unreasonable to argue that Soviet policy activism in Asia is the
centerpiece of a set of processes at work which collectively amount to a challenge to the
"old order" as we have known it. Although U.S. policy in Asia has been very successful in
the 1980s, many of the factors that made U.S. policy effective are changing fairly rapidly
and casting serious doubt that the U.S. will be as successful in the 1990s, for example, the
growing protectionism in the U.S. threatens the prosperity that seemed all but assured for
Asia; nationalism and anti-nuclear sentiment in the Pacific threatens to erode the American
alliance and forward basing system in the region; and the conflicts and rivalries between
communist states in Asia are beginning to weaken. See David Winterford, "Challenging the
Old Order: Recent Political, Economic and Strategic Initiatives in the Asia-Pacific," paper
being presented at the forthcoming ASPAC '89 Conference, Honolulu, June 30-July 2,
1989.
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The analysis of Soviet policy in Asia presented in this paper thus
focuses on three issues: (1) the shifting balance in trilateral Sino-Soviet-
American relations; (2) the impact of this shift on Soviet foreign policy in
Asia, with a specific example drawn from Southeast Asia, the Kampuchean
conflict; and (3) implications this analysis may have both for Asian decision-
makers and for U.S. policy toward the region.
I. Trilateral Relations: Sino-Soviet-American Ties
The fundamental assumption made in this analysis is that Soviet policy
in Asia in general, and in Southeast Asia in particular, must be seen within the
context of Soviet global foreign policy goals and priorities. In general,
Soviet decision-makers do not demarcate either Asia or Asian sub-regions
and fashion policies separate from broader geopolitical concerns. Indeed
despite assurances from Gorbachev that Soviet foreign policy would not be
dominated by the "American problem," it seems that in its recent Asian
initiatives the Soviet Union remains focussed on (1) challenging the US in
Asia; (2) weakening US alliances in the region; and (3) encouraging nascent
but developing sentiments of neutralism. In other words, Soviet foreign
policy seems targeted at reducing if not containing American presence and
influence in Asia.
A significant change may have occurred, however, in the means being
used by the Soviet Union to contain the U.S.. Having reaped a bitter harvest
from Afghanistan to Vietnam through the heavy-handed and expensive
reliance on military power to accomplish goals, it now appears that the
Soviets favor cheaper but possibly more effective tools for thwarting U.S.
interests, namely, politics and diplomacy. Gorbachev's "new thinking" may
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well represent politics taking command over guns as the chief instrument in
Soviet foreign policy. Indeed in remarks to the 27th Party Congress,
Gorbachev appeared to revise Soviet positions on security and war when he
stated: "Ensuring security is taking the form more and more of a political
task and it can only be solved by political means."
Indeed prior to Gorbachev's emergence as leader, there were already
major signs that Moscow was reassessing domestic and foreign policies. This
reassessment was prompted by several factors including (1) the adverse shift
in the global balance of power, (2) Soviet foreign policy setbacks in Europe
and the Third World, (3) the worsening of the domestic economic condition
and, (4) the resurgence of American power.
Although Europe held promise of some foreign policy successes,
particularly in West Germany, Soviet policy in Asia confronted cumulative
barriers of resistance that in their sum amounted to a "spectacular failure" for
Moscow. Virtually all the essential trends in the region were negative for
the Soviet Union including:
- the economic dynamism of Asia,
- the modernization of China,
- the Chinese barrier to Soviet expansion,
- the strengthening U.S-Japanese ties,
- the fitful dialogue between North and South Korea,
13
* M.S. Gorbachev, "Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee delivered 25
February by M.S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee,"
Pravda
. FBIS-Soviet Union, Party Congresses, February 26, 1987, pp. 1,10. Cited in
Garrett, "Gorbachev's Reassessment of Soviet Security Needs," p. 17.
14.
Robert A. Manning, Asian Policy: The New Soviet Challenge in the Pacific
(New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1988).
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- the coalescence of ASEAN with the remarkable economic surge in
Southeast Asia, and
- the ability of the United States to affect a triumphant political and
economic return to Asia after the military defeat in Indochina.
Many of these events were of course beyond the direct control of
Moscow's global planners. However even those issues most susceptible to
Soviet manipulation yielded a perversity which must have created rising
resentments among decision-makers. Not only had communism apparently
lost much of its appeal to Asian populations with the surging production of
consumer goods and the spread of democratic values, the Soviets discovered
they had not even been able to convert their awesome and expensively
acquired military power into the more useable currency of political
influence. Indeed the means Moscow had chosen to attain its foreign policy
goals in the Asia-Pacific in the early to mid 1980s were so counterproductive
that Western analysts should really have been more alert to the building
pressures for change. Wherever Moscow turned there was fresh evidence
that Soviet actions were themselves mainly responsible for rising anti-Soviet
feeling in the region: the invasion of Afghanistan—and the signals Moscow
sent that Soviet troops were on permanent deployment there; Soviet support
for Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea; Soviet alienation of Japan over both
the military buildup in and ownership of the Northern Islands; the enormous
Soviet military might massed on the borders with China; and finally, the
bitter confrontations within tangled Sino-Soviet-Vietnamese relations.
Surveying the catastrophe of Soviet relations in Asia, Gorbachev
quickly saw his task to be extricating the Soviet Union from the impasse of the
Brezhnev policies. The militarization of the Soviet domestic economy and
the militarization of Soviet foreign policy had confirmed the views of Soviet
neighbors and adversaries that, similar to most revolutionary states, the
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Soviet Union has inherently expansionist tendencies. The evidence was there
for all to see including planning for war in Europe, the military buildup in
the Soviet Far East and the deployment of vast numbers of troops along the
Sino-Soviet border. Believing in the march of global socialism, and
heartened by the prospect of quick victories in the soft terrain of the Third
World, the Soviets had plunged into Angola, Afghanistan, Ethiopia while
supporting Vietnam in its occupation of Kampuchea, all of which took place
within five years. However the result was not the anticipated victories but
prolonged internal strife in each of these countries as the years stretched into
a decade with each of them wracked by turmoil and war. Simply put, the
militarization of Soviet foreign policy did not bring military victories.
However, what it did bring was a great opportunity, which the United States
seized, for the U.S. to mobilize an international coalition of states against the
Soviet Union. In Asia, for reasons of size, geography, stature and interest,
China was the apparent centerpiece of this U.S. -inspired coalition. For
Gorbachev, successfully reversing these adverse trends thus meant making
China the centerpiece of his policy for dealing with the "American problem"
in Asia.
It is in this context of failed but costly actions that Gorbachev's
initiatives can be understood. Vast sums of Soviet national treasure had been
expended for only meagre results, other than a bountiful harvest of global
condemnation fully exploited by the United States. The challenge
confronting Gorbachev was to devise new methods of achieving Soviet
foreign policy objectives—and given the stagnation of the Soviet economy
these methods had to be cheap. In other words, the challenge was to create
new political and diplomatic means of accomplishing goals while holding
military power in reserve. First, in terms of policy, this meant arms control
David Winterford page 1
1
at both the nuclear and conventional levels. Rather than a crippling attempt to
sustain ever-higher levels of parity with Moscow's chief adversary—the
Brezhnev approach—Gorbachev advanced the concept of "reasonable
sufficiency." To the extent that reasonable sufficiency entails limiting
defense spending, it becomes feasible only in the context of a continuing arms
control process. Second, in terms of a political impact, arms control is a
means of signalling Moscow's intention of defusing international resentment
against the Soviet Union.
In other words, Gorbachev's "new political thinking" is intended to
facilitate collaboration in functional areas, such as control of nuclear
weapons, and to portray the Soviet Union as a willing and cooperative partner
in resolving international problems. Primary' among these problems are the
regional conflicts in the Third World, especially those in Afghanistan and
Kampuchea.
For Gorbachev, these regional conflicts blocked crafting new
approaches to handling the "American problem"—"how to contain the United
States." Since the United States had been successfully able to exploit these
conflicts in forming anti-Soviet coalitions, Gorbachev faced a very acute
dilemma—using cheaper and potentially more effective means of containing
the U.S. would entail reducing global hostility toward the Soviet Union and
that would mean addressing those conditions that gave rise to the international
antipathy. In Asia, Gorbachev and his advisors knew they needed China to
contain the US. Needing China more than China needs the Soviet Union
" Leszek Buszynski, "Gorbachev and Southeast Asia: Prospects for the 1990s"
(paper presented at the Australian National University Conference on The Soviets in the
Pacific in the 1990s, May 27, 1988) p. 3-4.
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meant Moscow had to woo Beijing and ask Beijing to dance—the price of
dancing with China in turn was (1) resolution of the Afghanistan and
Kampuchean conflicts, and (2) de facto recognition of China's dominant
position in Southeast Asia and acknowledgment of China's "global" power
status.
Although negotiations between the Soviet Union and China on
normalization of relations began in the 1970s only to be broken off as a result
of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and subsequently resumed in 1982,
Gorbachev's initiatives significantly accelerated the normalization process.
Especially noteworthy, his Vladivostok speech signalled that Moscow was
now prepared to address the key issues fueling hostilities and blocking a
rapprochement with China, namely, the ideological disputes and border
disagreements between the two Asian powers, and Chinese fears of Soviet
encirclement.
The reasons for Moscow's intense interest in much closer relations
with Beijing are not hard to determine. First, for over a decade Moscow had
feared that converging Sino-American threat perceptions would lead to a
deepening strategic relationship if not a de facto military alliance. Second,
China had skillfully played on these Soviet fears through its hyperbolic
rhetoric which repeatedly called for a global united front against Soviet
hegemonism. Finally, key decision-makers in Washington began to calculate
the benefits of an apparent "China card" to be played in relations with the
Soviets. Of course Soviet actions, especially the invasion of Afghanistan
followed quickly by the alliance with Vietnam and support for that country's
occupation of Kampuchea, only served to confirm the apparent usefulness of
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joint Sino-American consultations and thereby in a circular fashion further
heightened Soviet suspicions.
In other words, during the 1970s and early 1980s, Sino-American
rapprochement rested on a similar strategic assessment. Both countries, for
their own reasons, had cold relations with the Soviet Union and feared the
Soviet Union. It is important to recall that China only turned to the United
States because it felt threatened by the Soviet Union not because of any shared
consensus on fundamental values. After the chaos of the Cultural Revolution,
China needed a strong security partner to help deter the Soviet threat while
domestic order was reestablished. In turn, many in the United States saw
China as a counterweight to Soviet expansion in Asia and thus useful if not
vital for containing Moscow's imperial pretensions. Although several
analysts in the US warned against too close an embrace of Beijing, the policy
debate was won by those who argued that Sino-Soviet relations had
permanent structural weaknesses in the form of centuries of disputes fueled
by a 4200 mile border.
Despite several attempts, Brezhnev was unable to secure
rapprochement with China. Even after Mao's death and the eventual
emergence of Deng Xiaoping in 1978, conditions were still not propitious for
Sino-Soviet detente. Perhaps this is not too surprising since Deng had long
warned of the Soviet threat and even today is reputed to be less friendly
toward the Soviets than other Chinese leaders. In any event , the task
confronting Deng in the late 1970s was similar to that now facing Gorbachev,
namely, the need to remedy stagnation in the economy, reduce hostility
' New York Times, February 2, 1989.
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abroad, and end isolation from the main currents of international affairs.
Interestingly, Deng's response was to accelerate domestic economic reform
within the context of further association with the international system,
especially the western economic and security alliance. Tilting toward the
West provided China not only with capital, technology, and market access,
but as important, it provided a security link just as the Soviet Union was
reaching the zenith of its reach in the Third World.
Despite the notable pro-Taiwan sympathies of many in the new
Administration, Sino-American detente survived the transition to the Reagan
era and indeed eventually flourished under Reagan. In fact, the very success
of the deepening set of relations between the US and China mirrored the
deepening antagonism on the one hand between the US and the Soviet Union
and on the other hand between China and the Soviet Union. Indeed, the
successful isolation of Moscow
—
partly a result of the design of American
and Chinese foreign policy and partly the result of aggressive Soviet actions
in the Third World and Europe—set the conditions for the emergence of
Gorbachev's "new thinking." In some ways, the episodic containment of the
Soviet Union coupled with the internal deterioration of the Soviet economy
within the context of rising external enmity toward Moscow all but compelled
a radical shift in the means of achieving Soviet foreign policy.
Providentially for Gorbachev, Beijing had also concluded that the very
success of Chinese relations with the United States made it possible, indeed
desirable, to improve relations with Moscow. China became convinced that
improving relations with the Soviet Union was essential if Beijing was to
enhance its role in world affairs. At the same time, warmer ties with Moscow
carried the prospect of greater leverage for China in dealing with
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Washington. Thus at the 12th Congress of the CCP in September 1982,
General Secretary Hu Yaobang stated China intended to follow an
"independent foreign policy," a declaration which effectively distanced China
from the U.S. Shortly thereafter discussions resumed between the Soviet
Union and China at the vice-foreign minister level. Trade ties strengthened
and a variety of cultural, academic and technical links were revived after 20
years of atrophy.
Indeed prior to a political rapprochement, Moscow and Beijing had
concluded economic detente with fairly spectacular increases in trade
volumes occurring in the early 1980s. From a modest base of $300 million in
1 o
1982, bilateral Sino-Soviet trade grew to $2 billion by 1985. This
economic base was capped with a five year $14 billion trade agreement signed
in 1985, three months after Gorbachev became General Secretary. In other
words, overfour years ago it was becoming apparent tliat China s "tilted non-
alignment" toward the West might well be ephemeral. As it is. trade and
economic ties between the two countries have continued to grow to the extent
that the Soviet Union is now Beijing's fifth largest trading partner with
bilateral trade expected to amount to $2.8 billion for 1988. As such, the
Soviets have begun refurbishing outmoded Chinese factories that Moscow
designed and equipped in the 1950s. Indeed Moscow has even offered to
17
By 1989, wide-ranging Sino-Soviet cultural contacts were planned including the
first tour of the Bolshoi Ballet to China in 30 years. Christian Science Monitor, February
8, 1989.
18
' Manning, Asian Policy, p. 42.
19
The Economist, June 11, 1988.
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construct nuclear power stations in China. In a particularly interesting
economic venture, a new railway (the third linking China and the Soviet
Union) is expected to be completed in 1992. While this project has obvious
utility in facilitating trade by substantially shortening the distance between
Shanghai and the Soviet heartland, it is also indicative of the significant
reduction in tensions that has already occurred in this strategic geographical
21
area.
It is worth noting several aspects of these developments for they
indicate the seriousness of Soviet and Chinese intentions to normalize
relations. First, from the Chinese perspective, it is instructive that Moscow's
military buildup in Asia was occurring simultaneously with the opening
gestures of normalization. " In other words, even though the Soviet military
threat to China was increasing rather than diminishing, the Chinese were still
receptive to Soviet diplomatic, political and economic initiatives.
Second, during the very period that Sino-Soviet relations were already
improving, China stipulated the "three obstacles" to normalization. These
"obstacles" included: (1) massive Soviet troop deployments along the Sino-
20
Christian Science Monitor, February 9, 1989.
21.
' One Soviet aim in expanding Sino-Soviet economic ties is to tap Chinese
resources, particularly labor, to develop Siberia. In 1988, China began exporting
construction, logging and agricultural labor to meet shortages of workers in Siberia. In
return, China seeks Soviet technology and materials for upgrading its infrastructure in
heavy industry, primarily in the northeastern region of Manchuria. The Soviet Union has
also agreed to aid China in building new thermal power plants, power transmission lines
and electric railroads. The deepening of economic ties is also indicated by the Bank of
China's recent (and inaugural) participation in a syndicated loan to the Soviet Vneshekonom
Bank.
22. Steven I. Levine, "The Sino-Soviet-American Triangle Under Gorbachev," (paper
presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association,
Washington, D.C., September 2, 1988). Much of the material in the next few paragraphs
has been inspired by Levine 's insightful analysis.
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Soviet border; (2) the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; and (3) Soviet support
for Vietnam's occupation of Kampuchea. As is well-known, Beijing
continuously stressed that improving Sino-Soviet relations would not be
possible unless the Soviet Union acted to remove these obstacles.
For China, the three obstacles have been useful for advancing several
foreign policy aims. First, by regularly invoking the three obstacles China
has been able to regulate and control the pace of normalization with the Soviet
Union. Second, China has been able to use the three obstacles to suggest to the
world that, despite the improvement which had already taken place in
relations with the Soviet Union, China still opposed "hegemonic"
international behavior in its lofty, "principled" foreign policy. Finally, the
three obstacles calmed American fears about Sino-Soviet detente. Pursuing
domestic economic reform, Deng needed to ensure market access and the
continued flow of U.S. capital and technology. Washington obliged both
Chinese and Soviet foreign policy by interpreting the "obstacles" as virtually
insurmountable barriers to what Washington viewed as an unwanted
normalization of Sino-Soviet relations.
Viewed in this light, the three obstacles were not barriers to better
relations with the Soviet Union. Rather they were a framework created by
China, and reluctantly accepted by Moscow, within which normalization
could be pursued and regulated while other goals of Chinese and Soviet
foreign policy remained unharmed. In other words, by the time Gorbachev
had independently decided to adopt a political approach to containing the U.S.
in Asia, significant changes had already occurred in the trilateral
relationship. Quietly but effectively Beijing and Moscow had already
covered much of the ground toward rapprochement. Of great importance to
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China, this had been accomplished with no apparent cost to its relationship
with the United States. This feat was immeasurably helped by the timing of
China's response to the Soviet overtures: the process of Sino-Soviet
accommodation was begun while US-Soviet relations were still openly
hostile. Neither the Soviet Union nor China was prepared to acknowledge the
substantial convergence of interests that had occurred. Indeed both countries,
especially China, "sought to camouflage the political character of the
rapprochement."
From the beginning of his tenure as General Secretary, Gorbachev has
actively sought to build upon and enhance Sino-Soviet detente. His landmark
Vladivostok speech in July 1986 is perhaps the most famous of Gorbachev's
gestures to China. It is worth recalling that in that speech, Gorbachev
reaffirmed Soviet acceptance of the median-line principle for the disputed
river boundary in the far east, indicated the prospects for enhanced Soviet-
Chinese economic cooperation, offered to consider removing Soviet troops
from the Sino-Soviet and Sino-Mongolian borders, and announced a small
withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan (an announcement which the
State Department dismissed as a "ploy").
In other words, Gorbachev was quite willing to go some distance in
mitigating Chinese perceptions of a Soviet threat and fears of encirclement by
the Soviet Union, perceptions which had formed the basis of Beijing's
apparent tilt toward Washington. Indeed, Gorbachev's July 1987 decision to
23
Manning, Asian Policy, p. 43.
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* In 1986 Moscow additionally signalled the importance it placed on improving its
relations with China by assigning to Beijing one of its most experienced diplomats, Oleg
Troyanovshy, a former representative to the United Nations and to Japan. New York
Times, September 30, 1988.
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eliminate completely Soviet SS-20 missiles in Asia as well as Europe both
removed a barrier to improving political relations with regional actors and
earned considerable credit with Beijing for further reducing the Soviet
threat. The announcement by Gorbachev in his December 1988 address to
the U.N. General Assembly of even further troop reductions in Mongolia was
both an indicator and a forceful signal to Beijing of Moscow's determination
to press for completion of normalization in relations.
Indeed his announcement that a "major portion of Soviet troops'"
deployed in Mongolia would be withdrawn was an important sign of the
virtual elimination of the prospect of military conflict between the Soviet
Union and China. Moreover recent actions by Mongolian authorities are
illustrative of the quiet harmonizing of Sino-Soviet relations that had been
underway for quite some time. In contrast to earlier Mongolian fears of
Chinese hostility, during the last two years leaders in Ulan Bator have
vigorously pursued better relations with Beijing having concluded a new
consular treaty, an agreement on handling border problems, agreements on
cultural exchanges, scientific and technological cooperation and a railway
25
protocol. It is very unlikely that Mongolian authorities would have
concluded these agreements in the context of significant or rising hostilities
between China and the Soviet Union.
The Soviet courtship of China, including flattering China's sense of
great power status, is an ongoing component of Moscow's diplomatic
sparring with Washington. After each of the primary Reagan-Gorbachev
summits, Gorbachev dispatched his top Asian advisor, Deputy Foreign
25
Los Angeles Times, December 27, 1988.
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Minister Igor Rogachev, to Beijing to brief the Chinese. These meetings, in
turn, are part of a larger process of consultation recently agreed to by Beijing
and Moscow whereby high-level officials will meet on a regular basis to
resolve their differences over Indochina, the Korean Peninsula and other
26
regions.
The hectic pace of all of these political initiatives was capped by the
successful visit of Chinese Foreign Minister Quian Qichen to the Soviet Union
in early December 1988. For the first time in 30 years, China's Foreign
Minister met with his Soviet counterpart in Moscow. Although Kampuchea
and the other two "obstacles" were key issues in the talks, the ground was in
fact being prepared for the May summit between Deng and Gorbachev. In
exchange for Soviet assurances that significant pressure would be put on
Vietnam for a withdrawal of troops from Kampuchea—and an implicit
admission from Moscow that ties to China are more important than links to
Vietnam—Gorbachev received Chinese agreement to a Summit in the first
half of 1989.
27
The December meeting also included scheduling high-level discussions
between Chinese and Vietnamese officials. For the first time in over nine
years, in January, 1989, Vietnamese Deputy Foreign Minister Dinh Nho
Liem met with his Chinese counterpart, Liu Shuqing and later with Chinese
26
' Christian Science Monitor, February 6, 1989.
27.
In a statement timed to coincide with the arrival in Moscow of Foreign Minister
Qian Qichen, Vietnam announced that 18,000 troops would be withdrawn from Kampuchea
between December 15-21, 1988. This represented the last of 50,000 troops Hanoi
promised to withdraw in 1988 in a partial pull-out of its forces. New York Times,
December 2,1988.
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Foreign Minister Qian Qichen. At this meeting a negotiated compromise
was apparently worked out whereby Vietnam would concede the full
withdrawal of its troops from Kampuchea while China would apparently
drop its demands for a Kampuchean government of "national
29
reconciliation."
Having achieved an agreement in principle for a Summit, it remained
for Shevardnadze to travel to Beijing in early February, 1989 to fix a date for
30
the meeting between the top leaders. In exchange for this date,
Shevardnadze brought with him Hanoi's confirmation that it would indeed
withdraw from Kampuchea under the plan that Beijing and Hanoi had
negotiated in January. From the Soviet perspective, the Kampuchean issue is
best seen as a means to the larger end of a Summit. Indeed, while in Beijing.
Shevardnadze indicated that one of the purposes of his visit was to secure
agreement on the topics to be discussed at the May summit. Indicative of
Moscow's purpose in so ardently pursuing detente with China, the Soviet
Foreign Minister noted Soviet interest in discussing not only Sino-Soviet
issues but the much broader questions of Asian security and disarmament, a
topic Gorbachev has pursued in a dogged if one-sided manner since 1986."
However from China's perspective, Shevardnadze's confirmation of
28
" New York Times, January 20, 1989.
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Christian Science Monitor, February 2, 1989. See below pp. 30-33 for an
assessment of the implications of this agreement for resolving the Kampuchean conflict.
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New York Times, February 2, 1989.
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For an insightful analysis of Soviet arms control proposals for Asia, see Masahiko
Asada, "Soviet Security and Arms Control Initiatives and Objectives in the Pacific," paper
presented at The University of British Columbia Conference on Maritime Security and
Arms Control in the Pacific Region, May 19-21, 1988.
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Vietnam's agreement to withdraw provided Beijing with the long-sought
symbolic recognition of China's increasing authority: Moscow has
apparently sacrificed the interests of its Vietnamese ally for better relations
with China.
Even as relations between Beijing and Moscow are now being capped
by the Summit, both sides continue to argue disingenuously that closer bonds
between them will not harm their relations "with other powers." Indeed in a
move reaffirming China's determination to scuttle any American unease,
Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Tian Zengpai recently used a press conference
in Beijing to dispute the grandly positive interpretation that Soviet Foreign
Minister Shevardnadze had been placing on cessation of difficulties with
China.
Nevertheless as Soviet relations with China have steadily improved,
Chinese relations with the United States have slowly deteriorated. In fact at
times recently Sino-American relations have been characterized by fairly
open hostility, notably over Chinese missile sales to the Middle East and
Chinese policies in Tibet. Of some note, on both of these issues the Soviet
Union has remained virtually silent. With the Soviet Union and China
completing their normalization of relations, the enduring divisions between
the United States and China have come in to sharper relief. Indeed the
weakening of a shared perception of a Soviet threat has exposed
fundamentally opposing values between an individualistic, democratic and
pluralist America and a collectivism statist and authoritarian China.
32.
San Jose Mercury News, February 5, 1989.
33.
Levine, "The Sino-Soviet-American Triangle Under Gorbachev," pp. 18-19.
David Winterford page 23
On the other hand, it should be pointed out that with the cessation of
ideological polemics, there are few serious value conflicts between China and
the Soviet Union analogous to those between the United States and China or
between the United States and the Soviet Union. In fact the parallel reform
programs undertaken by Beijing and Moscow, wherein both are attempting to
reform socialism within an ongoing Leninist political structure, creates a
bond of shared concerns as the leadership in both countries face similar sets
of problems. Thus a new convergence between China and the Soviet Union is
not only conceivable but probable as their domestic reform programs unfold.
Western observers should not be surprised by this convergence for it
was powerfully signalled two years ago during Zhao Ziyang's visit to Eastern
Europe. China's then acting secretary of the Communist Party and premier
voiced sentiments highly congenial to both Moscow and the leadership of the
Eastern bloc countries he visited. For example, in Poland, where Western
leaders had been seeking to reverse the disillusionment in Solidarity over the
slow pace of their fight for more freedom, Zhao expressed Chinese
"admiration and satisfaction" with the actions of Polish Party and
Government in returning the country to the "proper" path of development.
In East Berlin, where demonstrations were occurring against the Berlin Wall,
Zhao warmly praised the durable German Democratic Republic leader,
Honecker, for his efforts to make "dialogue happen in Europe." In the more
Westernized Budapest, Zhao is reported to have reminded his audience that
the Chinese were waging a resolute fight against the "misleading ideas of
bourgeois liberalism." Moscow too had reason for satisfaction that detente
with China was both progressing and would yield significant political benefits
as Zhao used his 1987 tour of Eastern Europe to speak against the spread of
the arms race to space, in favor of banning all nuclear weapons, against their
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first use, and in favor of nonnuclear and peace zones. All of these
statements correspond very closely to Gorbachev's agenda since 1985.
Zhao's visit to Eastern Europe was in effect a return call for several
Eastern bloc leaders had already journeyed to Beijing in 1986, most notably
35
East Germany's Honecker and Poland's Jaruzelski. These mutual visits
indicated that over three years ago considerable convergence of interest
already existed between Eastern Europe and China on the desirability of
narrowing their ideological differences through establishing better political
as well economic ties. This is quite noteworthy for it is most unlikely that
either Honecker or Jaruzelski would visit Beijing without the prior approval
of Gorbachev. In other words, unlike his predecessors who feared closer ties
between Eastern Europe and China, Gorbachev encouraged these links and
used them as additional avenues of influence and communication with
Beijing.
While both China and the Soviet Union seek Western technology and
capital, it is most unlikely that either will see much merit in adopting Western
economic and political models. Given China's longer attempt at reform,
Chinese experience is perhaps instructive for Beijing has deliberately slowed
market-oriented reforms in an effort to "rectify the economic order" and
ensure continued political control by the Communist Party.
34
Further details of Zhao's visit may be found in Christian Science Monitor, July 8,
1987.
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Christian Science Monitor, October 21, 1986.
* Recently Chinese authorities have moved to reestablish detailed central controls
over the economy in an attempt to "rectify" a wide range of economic problems including
sharply rising prices, excessive growth, panic buying, bank runs and differing rates of
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One observer has recently concluded that the intensity and breadth of
Sino-Soviet relations suggests that ideological differences between the Soviet
Union and China have "evaporated" and that ideology has now become an
38
important "unifying force" between the two countries. Another observer
points out that both countries are "natural allies" in the mutual effort to
breathe life into poor and repressive societies
39
While the significance for global politics of this profound change
toward ideological harmony between China and the Soviet Union is only
being tentatively addressed by analysts and decision-makers, the change itself
has been facilitated in part by Gorbachev's promotion of the idea of "socialist
pluralism" rather than Marxist universalism. In other words, the apparent
Soviet recognition of national variations of socialism within the context of
"absolute independence" between socialist countries addresses significant past
Chinese fears about the domineering embrace of Moscow. Although most
observers have devoted considerable time to speculating about the impact of
Gorbachev's revisionist views on a loosening of Moscow's tight grip on
Eastern Europe they have virtually ignored the impact of his views on closet-
Soviet ties with China.
growth between more and less regulated parts of the country. New York Times, October
28, 1988, and The Economist, November 12, 1988.
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Christian Science Monitor, November 30, 1988.
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* Manning, Asian Policy, p. 45.
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One effect of all of these notable political initiatives is to make foreign
relations in the Asia-Pacific much more fluid than they have been in the
recent past. Not only does this fluidity affect Sino-Soviet politics but also the
foreign relations of other states, including the United States, which had
premised their policies on an enduring Sino-Soviet split. In this respect, it
must be emphasized that if there was a direct connection between the Soviet
threat to China and the geo-political shift of China to the United States, as
many have claimed, then we should anticipate that reductions in the Soviet
threat to China should provoke a similar shift by China away from the United
States. To the extent that Moscow is mainly concerned with the "American
problem," then promoting such a reorientation by China must viewed as a top
priority with the benefits far exceeding any costs.
Given the wide range of Sino-Soviet consultations on global and
regional issues that has already occurred, and the diminishing convergence of
interests between the United States and China on many of these issues,
Western policy-makers should be alert to the growing evidence that Sino-
Soviet detente is eventually likely to include overt military cooperation.
Soviet initiatives in Northeast Asia, and China's favorable response to them,
already indicate the broad outlines of a mutual arms control regime between
these two powers. Moreover, as Moscow has found elsewhere, the transfer of
military technology to China may well be an effective means of reestablishing
links to the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Recent events, including the
prospective settlement of the Kampuchea conflict on terms agreeable to China
and the widespread multi-dimensional improvement of Sino-Soviet relations,
serve to enhance the prospects of renewed military ties. Initially these
military links are most likely to include exchange visits and naval port calls,
as part of a series of steps carefully calibrated to minimize their impact and
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thus avoid alerting the United States, Japan and other Asian nations. The
prospect of renewed Sino-Soviet military cooperation does, of course, raise
troubling questions concerning the desirability, nature and extent of ongoing
transfers of American military technology to China.
Gorbachev has made Sino-Soviet relations the centerpiece of his Asia
policy, the success of which throughout the Pacific depends on
accommodation with Beijing. Indeed the warming in Sino-Soviet relations
has significant consequences for U.S. -Soviet-Chinese trilateral relations and
is a major factor shaping the global balance of power. In this respect it is
noteworthy that Soviet and Chinese security perceptions have already begun
to converge on the issue of Japanese rearmament. China is no longer
encouraging Japan to increase its defense capabilities to counter the Soviet
military buildup in Northeast Asia and China no longer praises the
enhancement of US-Japanese security ties. Instead the Chinese have joined
the Soviets in expressing alarm about Japan's efforts to improve its military
posture. Indeed Chinese fears of a resurgent Japan provide an additional
incentive for rapprochement with Moscow. In fact it may reflect both China's
diminished sense of threat from the Soviet Union and China's growing sense
that in the future Japan is likely to be its major rival in East and Southeast
Asia. The Soviets are of course playing on these Chinese fears of Japanese
militarization.
41.
' Of some interest in this process, Chinese troops along the Sino-Soviet border
recently hosted their Soviet counterparts at festivities marking the 61st Anniversary' of the
founding of the People's Liberation Army. Christian Science Monitor, February 6, 1989.
This is a further indication that border tensions and conflicts have been significantly
reduced, if not eliminated.
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A succinct statement of conflicting views in the United States on the sale of
American military equipment and technology to China may be found in the Wall Street
Journal, May, 5, 1986.
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Although U.S policy-makers have reacted to Sino-Soviet detente with
equanimity, part of this public posture is designed to avoid giving any
additional leverage to either China or the Soviet Union in dealings with the
United States.
43
Nevertheless, US concerns do exist especially given the new
options now available to Beijing and Moscow to redirect large numbers of
troops and other military material formerly devoted to the Sino-Soviet
border. For example, China may well feel free to become much more
involved with all of Asia, certainly Southeast Asia, now that tensions along its
northern borders have been greatly reduced. Similarly, the Soviet Union
will have greater military resources that could be redirected against Japan
and against US forces stationed in Japan. The desirability of making even a
tentative assessment of these new options indicates the profound impact on the
regional and global balance of power arising from Gorbachev's successful
pursuit of detente with China.
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' The most likely site of significant new conflict in Southeast Asia is the group of
islands and reefs in the South China Sea known as the Spratlys. Although not given much
coverage by the American media, both Vietnam and China have already fought repeatedly
over possession of these petroleum-rich and strategically placed islands. Indeed
Vietnamese Gen. Tran Man Cong has commented that "most ships passing between the
Pacific and Indian oceans go between the (Spratly) islands and our mainland. The islands
are like an unsinkable battleship.... China could build up the reefs and threaten Vietnam by
placing medium-size missiles there." (See Christian Science Monitor June 14, 1988.) Of
course, Vietnam would not be the only possible target for this threat capability. Vietnam,
Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia, and China claim all or portions of the Spratlys.
Moreover, little attention has so far been given to the ultimate significance of the Spratlys
for interdiction, or threatened interdiction, of the tremendous maritime shipping that passes
around them, making control of these islands almost as advantageous as control of the
Straits of Malacca.
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II. Soviet Initiatives in Southeast Asia
It is most useful to consider Soviet interest in Southeast Asia during the
Brezhnev era as a function of Moscow's global strategic concerns and
priorities. Fearing a Sino-American military alliance, Soviet global planners
could readily see significant political, military and strategic advantages from
acquiring base facilities in Vietnam. Indeed, Soviet interest and intrusion
into the region following Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea should be seen
largely as a product of Soviet policy toward China, particularly the Soviet
goals of encircling and intimidating China. Moreover the strategic leapfrog
to Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang was also part of the Soviet military and
political challenge to the United States. As the U.S. appeared to be in retreat
in Southeast Asia in the 1970s, Moscow's sudden appearance in Vietnam,
especially the acquisition of former American bases in that country, provided
apparent proof that the "correlation of forces" favored the Soviet Union and
its ideological compatriots. In other words, Vietnam was used by the Soviet
Union to challenge both China and the United States at a time when it seemed
to many observers that a Sino-American political, economic, and military
entente was close at hand.
Soviet interest in Southeast Asia has also been shaped by other Soviet
priorities including Moscow's interest in the non-aligned movement and with
key Third World countries such as Indonesia. The Soviets have long felt that
tensions between the Third World and the West arising from alleged
injustices stemming from colonialism to ever-present discord on trade,
45
Winterford, Assessing the Soviet Naval Build-up in Southeast Asia.
page 30 Sino-Soviet Detente
technology and debt issues would induce Third World states to move in
directions adverse to Western interests.
Not surprisingly some incompatibility exists between these strategic,
political and military objectives. in Soviet policy. The militaristic approach
characteristic of the Brezhnev era and graphically symbolized by the buildup
of Soviet naval power in Vietnam had the perverse (for the Soviets) result of
alarming Southeast Asian governments and further antagonizing China.
Despite the suspicion that Moscow's actions have generated throughout
Southeast Asia, the strategic alliance with Vietnam nevertheless:
- permits the Soviet Union to break out of its geographic and strategic
encirclement in Northeast Asia,
- enables the Soviets to flank Japan's energy corridor through the
Indonesian Islands;
- augments the sustainability of Soviet naval developments in the Indian
Ocean;
- provides a possible counterbalance to U.S. bases in the Philippines;
- extends Soviet power-projection towards Australia;
- raises Chinese perceptions of vulnerability;
- counters any future Chinese submarine threat in the area;
- provides a Soviet forward deployment base useful in regional conflicts
involving actors like China, Vietnam and ASEAN; and
- complicates U.S. naval planning in the region during crises (or possibly a
general war)
46
' Stephen Sestanovich, "The Third World in Soviet Foreign Policy, 1955-1985," in
Korbonski and Fukuyama, The Soviet Union and the Third World.
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For all of these reasons it is unlikely that Moscow would adopt a
strategy which carries a high-risk of losing access to bases in Vietnam.
Nevertheless Gorbachev's recent initiatives in Southeast Asia indicate
Moscow's determination to improve relations with China and other regional
actors. He clearly recognizes that Moscow's military buildup in Southeast
Asia has been successfully exploited by the U.S. in mobilizing an anti-Soviet
coalition and that Soviet reliance on military might has further alienated the
region from the Soviet Union. Consequently Gorbachev has reoriented
Soviet policy to legitimize a new Soviet political, economic as well as a
strategic role in the region. His multi-pronged strategy: emphasizes
enhancing ties with non-communist states in the region, seeks to erase
49
Moscow's negative image, encourages neutralist and anti-nuclear sentiment
in order to reduce U.S. strategic access to the region/ and seeks to maintain
the Soviet-Vietnamese alliance.
48
' While there may be little euphoria about Gorbachev in Southeast Asia, his
initiatives have been making an impact. Gorbachev's new approach is particularly evident
in Soviet relations with Thailand. Thailand is both the ASEAN state with closest relations
with China and coincidentally one of only two Southeast Asian states with defense
agreements with the United States. After Soviet Foreign Minister Schevardnadze's 1987
tour of Southeast Asia, Thailand's Foreign Minister visited Moscow followed by an
unprecedented visit by Thai army chief of staff, Chaovalit Yongchaiyut, to the Soviet
Union. Chaovalit is reported to have discussed not only regional concerns and Vietnamese
military incursions across the Thai border but also the possibility of Thai military
cooperation with the Soviet Union.
49
Indicative of Gorbachev's successful use of atrophied political and diplomatic
tools, top-level Thai officials were soon followed by most of their ASEAN counterparts in
similar high-level meetings with Soviet officials.
" For a recent analysis of the one-sided nature of recent Soviet arms control
proposals for Asia, see Asada, "Soviet Security and Arms Control Initiatives and Objectives
in the Pacific."
" While Western analysts have long grappled with the thorny issue of the extent to
which Moscow can dictate terms to Hanoi, Zagoria comments that "Moscow does not want
to risk eviction from strategically important bases in Cam Ranh Bay." See Donald S.
Zagoria, "Soviet Policy in East Asia: A New Beginning?" Foreign Affairs, Vol 68, No. 3
(1989), 120-138. On the surface, this would seem to give Vietnam the means for neatly
page 32 Sino-Soviet Detente
Indeed Southeast Asia is rapidly becoming a nexus of great power
rivalry as the United States, Japan, China and the Soviet Union all seek to
advance their national interests in this increasingly competitive arena.
Although Washington may well prefer the removal of Soviet influence in the
region, it is not at all clear that non-communist Southeast Asian governments
still share American concerns over a Soviet threat. Indeed as Moscow
gradually reduces its single-minded reliance on military power in favor of
addressing regional political concerns,and perhaps enhancing trade with
ASEAN, Washington may well confront a declining ability to forge and
maintain its anti-Soviet coalition in the region.
One reason ASEAN is increasingly receptive to Moscow is the
continuing fear of China. The reasons for this fear stem largely from China's
contiguous location, its size, past support for local Communist Parties and the
substantial ethnic Chinese populations in each ASEAN country. While some
observers may see this factor as an element in Sino-Soviet competition in
Southeast Asia, one must wonder if that rivalry is of any greater significance
than U.S-Japanese competition in the region. Indeed the selective fear of
China in Southeast Asia may well help the Soviets without necessarily
involving much cost to either Sino-Soviet or Soviet-ASEAN relations. China
is there and ASEAN knows it is not going away therefore a Moscow with
friendlier relations with China might well be seen in the region as better able
to exert influence over China, moderating potentially hostile Chinese actions.
This perception is even more likely to the extent that ASEAN governments
countering the coercive influence that Moscow might have otherwise expected from its $3
million per day subsidy of Hanoi.
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accept the view that Moscow sees its chief rivalry in Asia as being with the
United States not with China.
In this respect, the primary international issue on the ASEAN agenda is
the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea and the formation of a
moderate government of national unity in Phnom Penh. Ongoing attempts to
resolve the region's most notable conflict are currently providing Moscow
and Beijing with fresh glimpses of the types of foreign policy benefits they
might anticipate from continuing Sino-Soviet detente. As part of its new
political approach to the region, Moscow has now been playing an active role
in brokering a settlement to this conflict. Nevertheless it is critical to
recognize that this brokering role takes place within the context of warming
Sino-Soviet ties and that the state of Sino-Soviet relations is the key
determining factor regulating the nature and pace of the resolution of the
Kampuchea conflict.
Placing Moscow's brokering role within the context of Sino-Soviet
detente highlights recent developments that do not appear to be entirely
favorable for the preferred ASEAN/Western solution to this civil war.
Regional and western observers have been assuming that the broad outlines of
a Kampuchean settlement would include (1) a phased withdrawal of
Vietnamese troops in tandem with the cessation of external assistance to the
belligerents; (2) a U.N. peacekeeping force for an extended period of time;
(3) the establishment of a neutral coalition government; and (4)
internationally supervised elections. However it seems that the Sino-Soviet
summit in May is going forward based only on a Vietnamese withdrawal of
troops and Chinese assurances of a phasing out of its support for the
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resistance forces. In other words, at the present time there do not appear to
be any Soviet guarantees for an internal settlement among the various
fighting factions. Nor does it seem that China will necessarily compel a
provisional four-party coalition government headed by Prince Sihanouk.
Without that internal settlement, the Vietnamese-installed government can be
expected to continue the war against the anti-regime coalition. Briefly, Sino-
Soviet detente has crafted what Australian Foreign Minister Evans refers to
as an "external settlement" without addressing an internal solution to the
Kampuchean conflict. As there does not seem to be any requirement for
Moscow to pressure Vietnam to ensure a government of national
reconciliation, Sino-Soviet detente may mean that the resistance has lost
considerable leverage in its quest for a coalition government.
It is important to note the primary beneficiaries of this apparent Sino-
Soviet external settlement. First, China would appear to have one of its chief
demands met—the removal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea. Second,
China has forced the Soviet Union to acknowledge publicly that relations with
China take precedence over ties to Vietnam. Third, the Sino-Soviet accord on
Kampuchea has opened an avenue of communication for Vietnam with China,
potentially diminishing overt hostilities between the two countries and
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Christian Science Monitor, February 2, 1989.
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With agreement on Vietnamese withdrawal, China may continue to pressure the
Soviet Union for such a political solution but it is unlikely to do so with much vehemence.
Of course, it is possible that an acceptable internal political settlement might emerge from
the May Summit.
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possibly reducing Vietnam's threat perception along its borders with China.
Fourth, Vietnam may find that Kampuchean Prime Minister Hun Sen is not
required to share power with other national groups thus preserving
Vietnam's considerable post-withdrawal influence in Phnom Penh. ' Fifth,
the presence of Soviet military forces in Vietnam does not appear to be part
of a Kampuchean settlement and is unlikely to be affected in the near future.
Sixth, even half of a settlement is likely to enhance Soviet stature both in the
region and globally, lending credence to Moscow's new image and legitimacy
to Soviet determination to be included in regional affairs. It must be
emphasized that these "benefits" are a direct result of Sino-Soviet detente and
consequently should alert regional and Western decision-makers to the
potentially damaging ramifications of the warming ties between Moscow and
Beijing. Finally, it remains to be noted that in all of these developments
Washington has been a conspicuously minor player, having ceded the
initiative to others in a region where not long ago the U.S. was viewed as a
"king-maker."
Even an external settlement of the Kampuchean conflict promises to
alter the geopolitical terrain in Southeast Asia. Once an accord is concluded it
will be increasingly difficult for the United States to continue pressing for
Vietnam's isolation. Indeed, China is most unlikely to continue as
Washington's active partner in containing Vietnam. Consequently, the end of
" Especially in light of the agreements reached in January, 1989 during meetings in
Beijing between Vietnamese First Deputy Foreign Minister, Dinh Nho Liem, and ranking
officials of the Chinese Foreign Ministry. New York Times, January 26,1989.
' Recent reports indicate that at the second round of peace talks in Jakarta during
February, 1989, the Kampuchean factions remain deeply divided over the form of any
interim government and the nature of an international peacekeeping force to monitor any
agreement. New York Times, February 17,1989.
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Vietnam's isolation will open the prospect for Hanoi's large-scale economic
and political involvement not only in the region but also with Japan and other
57
Western countries. Of course this might mean a long-term diminution of
Soviet influence in Vietnam as Hanoi finds its pressing needs met elsewhere.
By the same token, Vietnam's integration into the region might dilute Chinese
influence in Southeast Asia. In that respect, it is not at all certain that a more
independent Vietnam, increasingly a participant in regional affairs, will be
perceived by China to be in its national interest. Detente with the Soviet
Union might thus be considered by Beijing as perhaps one way of exercising
indirect influence over Hanoi. For the United States, Vietnam's successful
interaction with ASEAN is most likely to alter the tenor of that organization
and compel a reassessment of the range of possible American policy options.
For example, with the end of Vietnam's isolation as a consequence of a
settlement in Kampuchea, Vietnam will be in a position to stimulate neutralist
and anti-nuclear sentiments in the region. Minimally, Hanoi will put a
significant brake on any American hopes that ASEAN will become a
collective regional defense organization in partnership with the United States.
m. Implications for US Policy
President Gorbachev has made determined efforts to improve relations
with European and Asian countries. Recognizing that the Soviet Union is a
Euro-Asian continental power, he has effectively stressed to Western
European publics that Europeans and Soviets all share a common home while
57.
Hanoi regards U.S. recognition as the linchpin to break its political and economic
isolation which was imposed by the West and China after Vietnam invaded Kampuchea ten
years ago. The primary factor compelling Hanoi to seek better ties with the U.S. is the
desperate state of Vietnam's economy. In order to revive production, Vietnam is in critical
need of foreign capital and technology.
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he also vividly reminds his Asian audiences that the Soviet Union is an Asian
land power. In both instances evocative Soviet imagery seeks to undercut
American presence and influence by consistently emphasizing Moscow's
geographic imperative and America's geographic isolation. Perhaps the most
prominent feature of Gorbachev's foreign policy is then not novelty but
continuity-Moscow still seeks to drive wedges between the U.S. and its
friends and allies. The hallmark of Gorbachev's policy activism is his
determination to use political, diplomatic and economic means rather than
only brute military might to accomplish goals. The most significant result to
date is the landmark rapprochement with China.
The success the Soviet Union has already attained in Asia is indicative
of the challenge confronting U.S. policy-makers. In significant respects, the
balance of power in Asia may have already shifted, and still be shifting, in
ways unfavorable to the United States. Most notably, Washington can no
longer take for granted enduring Sino-Soviet hostility. This does not mean
that the West should expect a return to the tight political and military alliance
between Beijing and Moscow characteristic of the 1950s. Nevertheless, in
conceiving of foreign policy as offering a continuum of possibilities rather
than an either-or choice, it is likely that Beijing and Moscow will continue to
work ever more closely together in a widening range of areas. This must
impact U.S. interests in Asia. At the same time, it is unrealistic to expect that
Sino-American relations can remain unaffected by the profound changes in
Sino-Soviet ties. After all, Soviet foreign policy is guided by Soviet global
policies and priorities, the centerpiece of which remains the "American
problem."
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Although Sino-Soviet detente heralds the most significant challenge to
American dominance in the Pacific in decades, other events are also posing
new challenges and offering new opportunities to the United States. On
balance, they suggest that U.S. policy in Asia in the 1990s is unlikely to be as
successful as it was in the 1980s. A number of trends are coming together,
some of which have been examined in this paper, which are mutually
reinforcing and which collectively may substantially undermine U.S. security
planning in the region. For example, the Vietnamese are withdrawing from
Kampuchea yet Vietnam is still likely to control Indochina with troops
remaining just over the border. ASEAN is likely to end its relative isolation
of Vietnam, integrating Vietnam into regional economic and political affairs.
While this holds the potential for a more peaceful region, it must also be
recognized that Vietnam's influence in Southeast Asia is bound to increase in
ways unfavorable to the U.S., for example strengthening those forces already
disposed to neutralism and anti-nuclear sentiments. In other words, the U.S.
confronts even greater pressure on its strategy of forward deployment.
Indeed the United States should anticipate much more difficulty in
maintaining even a loose alignment of states in the region.
Moreover, the prospect is closer at hand for a.fundamentally adverse
shift in the balance of power through the reinforcing impact of (1) Sino-
Soviet detente, (2) Sino-Soviet security cooperation, (3) China's continuing
efforts to develop a blue-water navy, and (4) a more assertive Soviet Union
offering an alternative type of leadership to a loose collection of non-aligned
states.
As Manning has observed:
The first step in safeguarding U.S. interests is recognizing that the
Soviet Union has become a major player on what previously had been
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an American home court. This dramatically reduces the American
margin of error and increases the need for enlightened activism. A
complacent or defensive U.S. approach runs the risk of losing the
initiative and permitting the Soviets greater opportunity to shape the
political environment.
The foundation for Manning's "enlightened activism" should be a clear
recognition among American decision-makers that the anti-Soviet coalition
forged by the U.S. in Asia, consisting of the United States, Japan and China,
has been severed. Not only is the balance of power shifting but "the
59
American spell over East Asian diplomacy is broken"" giving the Soviet
Union a freedom it has not enjoyed for decades to conduct its Pacific policy.
58
' Manning, Asian Policy, p. 92.
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